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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of a generous, spatially-targeted economic development 
policy (the federal Empowerment Zone program) on local neighborhood characteristics and on the 
neighborhood quality of life, taking into account the interactions amongst the policy, changes in 
neighborhood demographics and neighborhood housing stock. Urban economic theory posits that 
housing prices in a small area should increase as quality of life increases, because people will be 
willing to pay more to live in the area, but these changes in prices and quality of life will also affect 
the demographics of the population through sorting and the housing stock through reinvestment.  
Using census block-group-level data, we examine how housing prices respond to the Empowerment 
Zone policy intervention.  Changes in the other dimensions of neighborhood quality (demographics 
and housing stock characteristics) will also help determine the total –  or full –  effect on housing 
values of the policy intervention.  This paper estimates these direct and full effects in a simultaneous 
equations setting, compares direct and indirect effects and examines the robustness of the effects to 
alternate estimation strategies.  We find strong evidence for substantively large and highly 
significant direct price effects, while results suggest that the indirect effects are substantively small 
or even negative.   
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I. Introduction 
Spatially targeted economic development policy has been a popular tool for addressing the problem 
of entrenched concentrations of poverty in urban areas.   Such spatially targeted programs usually 
consist of tax incentives and other off-the-books expenditures.  Over the 1980’s many states created 
such programs, generically referred to as enterprise zones,1 which provide economic incentives 
(usually through tax abatements) for companies that create jobs in depressed areas.  While the 
popularity of such programs is irrefutable, the efficacy of spatially targeted development incentives 
is not well understood.  Although early case-study research suggested that the programs were 
effective, more recent research has cast this early consensus into considerable doubt. 
During the Clinton administration, the Federal Government created a similar program, called 
Empowerment Zones (EZs).  Designated EZs received at least $100 million in federal Social Service 
Block Grant funds to be administered by the states with considerable latitude.  Businesses in EZs are 
also eligible for a variety of tax incentives outlined in IRS (2004).  These incentives include an 
employment tax credit of up to $3,000 per qualified employee, increases in the amount of equipment 
and property purchases that can be deducted immediately instead of over time through depreciation 
(the section 179 deduction), the ability to postpone declaration of capital gains on qualified assets 
and increased exclusion of gains from sales of small business stock.  Governments are allowed to 
issue tax-exempt bonds for qualified expenditures in EZs.  State and local governments were 
encouraged to supplement the federal program with their own tax incentives and expenditures.  This 
program was continued during the early years of the Bush administration.  At present, the EZ 
initiative covers over 700 census tracts with a combined population of over 3 million individuals in 
31 communities (Greenbaum and Bondonio 2004).   Although the generosity of the program has 
1 Terminology in this field is unfortunately problematic, because the state-level programs have various names.  In this 
paper, we use the term enterprise zone to signify any of the various state programs and Empowerment Zone (or EZ) to 
refer to the more generous federal program.  A federal program called enterprise communities also exists, but this 
program is more similar to the state programs than the federal Empowerment Zone program. 
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varied over time, total incentives and grant expenditures are valued at over $5 billion, according to 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD 2009).  Despite the extent of the 
program, the literature on the effects of the EZ program is relatively undeveloped compared to the 
literature on state enterprise zone programs.  
 In this paper, we examine the effects of the federal program over a wide variety of 
neighborhood-level indicators.  We focus on the total effect of the Empowerment Zone intervention 
on home values, which likely includes not only direct effects but also several types of indirect 
effects.  This approach conceives of neighborhood outcomes as the result of a complicated interplay 
between economic, demographic and housing market forces.  Recent researchers have had trouble 
finding significant direct effects of spatially targeted economic development programs.  By 
identifying both the direct effects and the indirect effects, our approach offers EZ status its “best 
chance” to show some positive effect on neighborhood quality.   
Our results show that for our preferred measure of neighborhood quality (housing values) EZ 
status appears to have had statistically significant and substantial positive effects.  The effects of EZ 
status on other neighborhood characteristics are more mixed. The indirect effects vary somewhat 
depending on specification and estimation method, but are generally either small or negative. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the literature on state and 
federal spatially targeted economic development incentives.  Section III lays out a conceptual 
foundation for our empirical section, discusses the empirical specification and describes the data.  
Section IV presents and discusses the results.  Section V concludes.   
 
II. Literature 
Winnick (1966) lays out a very strong case against place-based policy.  The primary justification for 
spatially targeted economic development programs lies in the persistence of concentrations of 
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poverty, mainly in urban areas.  Kain (1968) framed the problem in terms of the spatial mismatch 
hypothesis (SMH), which posited that blacks were prevented from commuting or moving to the 
suburbs, where their labor was demanded, and that low-skill jobs were prevented from moving into 
the central city, where the low-skill black population lived.  The spatial mismatch of low-skill labor 
supply and low-skill labor demand causes the location-constrained inner-city residents to experience 
adverse labor market outcomes.  Since that seminal paper, spatially-targeted policies have become 
popular at many levels of government.  While the SMH enjoyed several decades of empirical 
support, more recent work taking into account the endogeneity of residence choice has cast some 
doubt on the causal relationship between spatial mismatch and poor central city labor market 
outcomes.2   Whether the SMH holds or not, it is widely accepted by policy-makers and spatially 
targeted economic incentives can be seen as an attempt to correct for the cost differentials that keep 
businesses from locating in the inner city. 
 Even in the absence of a causal effect of spatial mismatch, local jurisdictions may wish to 
spur development within their boundaries to increase tax receipts.  It is not far fetched to believe that 
localized tax incentives could be beneficial for local jurisdictions, even if they had no effect on the 
indigenous population.  Bartik (1991) reviewed the literature on the effects of local taxes on business 
activity and found that the elasticity of business activity with respect to local tax rates lay 
somewhere between -1 and -3.  If this is true, decreasing local taxes (even in a small section of the 
jurisdiction) could be revenue-enhancing for local governments.3  These large elasticities suggest 
2 Gurmu et al.(2008) uses panel data to control for individual-specific fixed effects, finding that access to employment 
has little effect on employment outcomes for their sample of Atlanta-area TANF recipients.  Kling et al. (2004) use the 
random assignment of neighborhood achieved in the Moving To Opportunity experiments to look at the effects of job 
access and find that the experimental group (who were encouraged to move to low-poverty neighborhoods) did not have 
better labor market outcomes.   
3 These elasticity figures pertain to changes in business activity within a metropolitan area.  Elasticities are of much 
smaller magnitude (between -0.1 and -0.6) when comparing changes in business activity across large areas.  This implies 
that any tax advantages a jurisdiction might expect are coming primarily from other near-by jurisdictions, not through the 
attraction of business from other parts of the country.  Of course, in the case of targeted incentives, the lower taxes may 
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that the effects of local tax incentives may be large and that enterprise zones may be an effective 
policy tool from a local perspective. 
 Research examining the effects of spatially targeted incentives has concentrated on the 
various state programs.  While many studies have found that enterprise zones have faired well in 
terms of employment, Boarnet (2001) points to the many methodological pitfalls inherent in straight 
comparisons of zones to non-zone areas.  More rigorous evaluations of the state programs have not 
been lacking.  An extensive review of this literature can be found in Peters and Fisher (2002).  They 
find that while early econometric studies of the effects of state enterprise zones usually found 
positive results (e.g., Erickson and Friedman 1990, Papke 1993, Papke 1994), more recent results 
have been much less favorable.4  Peters and Fisher offer several possible explanations for this set of 
findings.  They suggest that the tax incentives are not generous enough to overcome the substantial 
disadvantages associated with the targeted areas.  They also suggest that the administration of zones, 
which often put conditions on the incentives that exist, may reduce their attractiveness.  Bondonio 
and Greenbaum (2007) suggests that the insignificant net effects mask countervailing positive effects 
on new firms and negative effects on existing firms (who exit the zone), along with a number of 
other interesting results.  Lynch and Zax (2008) look at establishment-level data, finding little effect 
for the state program in Colorado.  They suggest that the benefits of the program likely fall on 
immobile factors like commercial real estate.  Landers (2006) finds similar results for the Ohio state 
program.   
 The literature examining the effects of the federal Empowerment Zone program is much less 
developed, but growing.  It is important to note that selection into the EZ program differed 
be drawing businesses away from other parts of the same jurisdiction.  Such possibilities complicate cost/benefit analysis 
of such programs.  In this paper we focus only on the local effects of the program, not the measurement of the benefits. 
4 Boarnet and Bogart (1996), Greenbaum (1998) Greenbaum and Engberg (2000), Engberg and Greenbaum (1999), 
Bondonio and Engberg (2000) and Peters and Fisher’s (2002) own analysis all point towards this conclusion.  Elvery 
(2004) is another very careful analysis that finds insignificant results of enterprise zone status.   
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substantially from selection into state programs.  In selecting federal Empowerment Zones, HUD 
required an application process.  Applicant zones were evaluated not only on the demographic and 
economic “needs” of the zones, but also the expected efficacy of the applicants planned use of 
program funds.  Wallace (2003, 2004) examines this process, while Greenbaum and Bondonio 
(2004) examine how the process has changed over the three rounds of the program.  Oakley and 
Tsao (2006, 2007a, b) use propensity score matching, as in much of the recent literature on the state 
programs, to examine the effect of Chicago’s and some other Empowerment Zones on a variety of 
socio-economic neighborhood outcomes.  While they find some localized effects (e.g. on poverty 
and related variables in the case of Chicago’s zone), they characterize the effects as underwhelming.  
When pooling four zones (in Chicago, Baltimore, Detroit and New York City), the intervention had 
no significant effects on poverty, unemployment or average household income.   
 Although most of the studies mentioned above examine job creation or employment 
outcomes, our primary variable of interest will be the value of owner-occupied housing in a 
neighborhood.  We will also be examining the effect of EZ status on employment outcomes of 
neighborhood residents, yet this more traditional variable takes a secondary position in that we 
examine only the direct effects of the program on employment.  This focus makes sense because the 
Empowerment Zone program is supposed to improve neighborhoods along a variety of dimensions 
(McCarthy 1998), not just improve employment outcomes.  As such, the general quality of life in a 
neighborhood should be improved by the program.  If the program is successful in making a 
neighborhood more attractive, the price of housing should increase (Rosen 1974, Bartik and Smith 
1987).  Our empirical approach allows us to examine the effects of EZ status on many other 
variables of more traditional concern (employment outcomes, poverty, etc.), but housing values will 
remain our focus.   
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 Two recent studies that look at the Empowerment Zone program direct effects on a national 
level are Hanson (2008) and Busso and Kline (2008).  Busso and Kline (2008) use propensity score 
matching techniques to assess the causal, direct effects on a variety of neighborhood characteristics.  
They find significant, robust and generally positive effects on neighborhood racial makeup, 
employment, educational attainment poverty and home values.  Hanson (2008) uses an instrumental 
variables approach to address the endogeneity of zone designation.  He finds evidence of 
endogeneity among his sample of zone and rejected zone applicants, but is not willing to take a 
strong position on the final direct effects.  When controlling for endogeneity, he finds no statistically 
significant effect on employment, although he finds very large effects on property values in some 
specifications.     
 
III. Empirical model and data 
 We expect that the EZ program’s effects will be various.  EZ program tax incentives might 
increase demand for commercial or residential land.  Alternatively, EZ program monies might be 
used to improve neighborhood amenities (e.g. infrastructure, parks, crime prevention, 
beautification).  If additional social services are made available for zone residents, this could also 
increase the demand for residential land in the zone.  These program effects will increase property 
values within the zone.  We term these price effects due to changes in local amenities as the “direct 
effects” of the program. 
 At the same time – and depending on its local implementation – the EZ program could cause 
the neighborhood’s demographics and the housing stock to change.  If EZ expenditures somehow 
lower crime, families with children may be attracted to the neighborhood.  EZ expenditures and tax 
incentives may encourage the construction of certain types of housing, or the demolition of vacant 
housing.  If these neighborhood demographic and housing stock characteristics are valued by 
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homeowners, neighborhood housing prices will respond to these neighborhood composition effects 
of the EZ program.  We term these price changes as the “first-order indirect effects” of the program.   
 The indirect effects do not end there, however.  If EZ incentives and expenditures change 
demographics or the housing stock, then these changes might induce further changes in each other.  
Incentives encouraging single-family, detached housing might force out poorer renters, while 
expenditures luring in more affluent residents might encourage developers to produced detached 
housing for these hoped-for in-migrants.  To the extent that the market values more affluent, 
suburban style neighborhoods, there will be further changes in prices.  We call these price changes 
due to the interaction of demographic and housing stock characteristics the “second-order indirect 
effects” of the EZ program.   
 Finally, to the extent that neighborhood demographics and housing stock respond to the 
changes in housing prices themselves, there will be a second round of adjustments in housing 
characteristics and neighborhood demographics induced by the price changes themselves.  These 
second-round adjustments will cause further changes to the price of housing, which in turn will 
induce a third round of adjustment and so on in a “multiplier” process.  We term both the first- and 
second-order indirect effects as well as the extra “kick” provided by the multiplier process as a 
general “indirect effect.”  Thus, the “full effect” is the direct effect plus the indirect effect.  Below, 
we lay out an empirical model that allows us to estimate both the direct and the various indirect 
effects in a simultaneous equations setting.   
A. Empirical model 
The empirical model used is similar to Noonan et al.’s (2007), where standard hedonic 
considerations are used to motivate a first-stage hedonic equation of the form: 
1 1 1 1it P it EZ it S it N it M it i t itP P EZ S N Mβ β β β β β ε ε ε−= + + + + + + + +  
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where t indexes time, i indexes neighborhoods, P is the log of the median house value value, S is a 
vector of structural characteristics of the neighborhood housing stock, N is a set of neighborhood 
demographic characteristics, M is a vector of municipal characteristics such as public services and 
taxes that may vary with time.  The equation includes a time-specific error term as well as a 
neighborhood-specific component (ε1i) which captures the effects of unmeasured neighborhood 
attributes which affect housing prices.  Finally, the EZ variable allows the designation of a 
neighborhood as an Empowerment Zone to have an independent effect on neighborhood 
attractiveness.  Such an effect is possible if EZ tax incentives increase access to employment in the 
area, or the federal funds are used to improve neighborhood quality, or lower taxes. 
 This is essentially a partial adjustment model in prices, where neighborhood housing prices 
adjust incompletely towards a neighborhood-specific, time-varying long run equilibrium over the 
course of a decade: *1 1(1 )( )it it P it it itP P P Pβ ε− −− = − − + , where the non-price terms in our equation 
control for P*.  While the lagged price term is not usually included in first-stage hedonics, we 
include it because we do not want to impose the assumption that prices adjust fully.  This assumption 
might be especially problematic in the context of our data (described below) because our prices are 
neighborhood medians derived from the census long form, not sales data.  The values which owners 
assess to their homes may be slower to adjust to neighborhood change than sales prices, so the 
partial adjustment process makes sense in this context.   
A problem with the OLS approach to the hedonic equation in levels is that the unobserved 
neighborhood characteristics, ε1i, can be correlated with the other variables of interest.  This may be 
especially important in the context of EZs, since EZ designation was not randomly distributed, but 
was targeted at distressed neighborhoods (Greenbaum and Bondonio 2004).  To mitigate this 
problem, we estimate the model in first differences.  By identifying the parameters from within-
neighborhood changes in neighborhood characteristics, this strategy purges our parameter estimate 
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of bias from the omission of time-invariant variables (Mendelsohn et al. 1992, Zabel 1999).  Our 
primary equation of interest can be expressed as in equation (1), 
 (1) 1 1it t P it EZ it S it N it M it itP P EZ S N Mβ β β β β β ε−= + + + + + +      , 
where 1,, −−= titiit XXX  and βt = ε1t –ε1t-1.  Differenced out of this equation are the time-invariant 
factors affecting prices, ε1i.  This differencing eliminates one possible source of endogeneity.  In the 
regressions reported below, we actually allow several time-invariant variables to be included 
(interacted with time) and thus affect neighborhood price appreciation.  These additions to the 
model are described in section III.C.      
  It is likely that many of the variables in equation (1) are set simultaneously with price, 
however, so that equation (1) is part of a larger system.  If changes in neighborhood quality also 
affect the types of housing and demographic characteristics, it will be important to control for the 
simultaneity bias when estimating the direct and indirect effects of federal intervention on home 
values.  As with housing prices, we model the neighborhood housing stock as a partial adjustment 
process, with current levels a function of lagged levels and other variables.  Like equation (1), we 
run the regressions in first differences:   
(2) 1 2it t S it EZ it N it P it M it itS S EZ N P Mγ γ γ γ γ γ ε−= + + + + + +       . 
Here, the housing stock depends on its past levels, Empowerment Zone status, neighborhood 
demographics, price and other considerations.  The kind of housing built in a neighborhood depends 
upon past levels because housing is a very durable asset and changes in the housing stock (at the 
aggregate level) will be gradual.  These structural characteristics might also depend on EZ 
designation if program funds are used to clear abandoned housing or to subsidize construction of 
new housing.  The housing stock may also depend on the neighborhood demographics (if rich people 
demand different kinds of housing than poor people), municipal-level variables (zoning restrictions, 
tax treatment) and geographic variables (which are differenced out of equation (2)).  Finally, the 
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price of housing may affect the kind of housing built because housing is produced using land and 
capital.  Production theory suggests that if land becomes more expensive, some substitution towards 
capital will occur.  Since our price variable includes the value of the land on which a unit sits, we 
expect some effect, although the sign depends on substitution elasticities in the production and 
consumption of housing services.   
 We apply similar logic to the modeling of neighborhood demographic characteristics. 
Neighborhood demographics follow a partial adjustment process and we difference the equation to 
control for unobserved fixed effects.  
(3) 1 3it t N it EZ it S it P it M it itN N EZ S P Mδ δ δ δ δ δ ε−= + + + + + +      . 
In equation (3), lagged changes in demographics are persistent because housing market frictions 
prevent neighborhood demographics from reaching their equilibrium levels between periods.  
Demographic groups’ differing demands for neighborhood quality or services provided by the EZ 
program may cause them to sort into neighborhoods being improved by EZ programs according to 
their willingness to pay for these attributes (Diamond and Tolley, 1982).  Similar sorting according 
to municipal characteristics would be expected.  Similarly, changes in housing stock may 
differentially attract different demographics, at least when the capital stock is somewhat inelastic.  
Finally, the price level in a neighborhood could affect neighborhood demographics if certain 
demographics are “priced out” of a neighborhood when prices increase. 
The system of first-differenced equations (1)-(3) can be represented in matrix notation as in 
equation (4). 
(4) 
1 1
1 2
1 3
1
1
1
S N it EZ M t P it it
P N it EZ it M it t S it it
P S it EZ M t N it it
P P
S EZ M S
N N
β β β β β β ε
γ γ γ γ γ γ ε
δ δ δ δ δ δ ε
−
−
−
   − − + +     
        − − = + + + +        
        − − + +        
  
   
  
. 
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 In this paper, we are specifically interested in the total effect of the EZ policy intervention.  
System of equations (4) shows us that these effects depend on its direct effect ( EZβ ) and also on its 
indirect effects.  Totally differentiating and dividing through by ZEd   yields: 
(5) 
1 /
1 /
1 /
S N EZ
P N EZ
P S EZ
dP dEZ
dS dEZ
dN dEZ
β β β
γ γ γ
δ δ δ
 − −   
    − − =    
    − −    
 
 
 
. 
The full effect on neighborhood housing prices due to the implementation of the Empowerment 
Zone policy is thus available through the application of Cramer’s Rule: 
(6) 
( ) ( ) SNPPSNPPNS
SNEZEZSNEZNSEZNEZSEZ
ZEd
Pd
δγδγδβγδγβ
δγβγδβδγβδβγββ
−+−+−
−++++
=
1
 .  
This expression for the full effect relates closely to the intuition laid out in our conceptual model at 
the beginning of this section.  The “direct effect” on price is captured by the first term in the 
numerator.  The next two terms are the “first-order indirect effects”: ZE ’s effect on P  through S  
and N .  The fourth and fifth terms represent “second-order indirect effects”: ZE ’s effect on P  
through S ’s effect on N  and N ’s effect on S .  The negative term corrects for double counting.  
The denominator accounts for the bidirectional effects of P  on S  and N  and their effects back on 
P , described as a “multiplier effect” above.  If there is no simultaneity in equation (4) this total 
derivative reduces to the first three terms in the numerator.   
 As in Noonan et al. (2007), the system of equations is considerably more complex because S 
and N are vectors.  We assume that each variable in N depends on its own lag; the vectors EZ, S and 
M; and the contemporaneous values of the other variables in N.  Likewise, each S variable is 
assumed to depend on its own lag; the vectors EZ, N and M; and the contemporaneous values of the 
other variables in S.  Our implementation of the system in equation (4) thus models each S  and N  
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equation as dependent on that variable’s own lagged difference, ZE , M  and the other endogenous 
variables.   
 This paper tries to disentangle both the direct and indirect effects of EZ program 
participation.  To this end, the system of equations represented in (4) is estimated simultaneously.  
To do so, we require at least one exogenous variable for each endogenous variable in each equation.  
The partial adjustment theory used to generate the empirical equations suggests the twice-lagged 
levels of each variable will be both exogenous and excludable in the context above.  These excluded 
variables will be sufficient to just identify the system and allow estimation.5   
 There is a simpler method for estimating a full effect of the policy.  In estimating equation 
(1) with OLS, the coefficient βEZ represents the partial or direct effect of the Empowerment Zone 
policy intervention on prices, holding other endogenous variables constant.  However, if equation (1) 
were estimated constraining βS and βN to be zero (equivalently, omitting the endogenous variables 
from the regression), the returned coefficient on the policy variable EZ will represent the effect of 
the policy intervention holding nothing constant.  In other words, estimation of a price equation 
containing only the exogenous variables and EZ will return an unbiased estimate of the full effect 
computed in equation (6).  The difference between the direct and full effects is what we call the 
“indirect effect.”  While this approach to the indirect effects makes it impossible to trace the avenues 
by which the indirect effects are generated (through S or through N), it is simple and possibly more 
robust to misspecification than the systems approach.  For that reason, in this paper we will compute 
indirect and full effects by both methods. 
 
5 Specifically, we have 18 endogenous variables (11 N variables, 6 S variables and P).  Taking the price equation as an 
example, there are 18 endogenous variables in this equation (the 17 contemporaneous changes in the N and S variables 
and the lagged change in prices).  As excluded instruments, we use the twice-lagged levels of each of the variables, 
which provides 18 exclusion restrictions in the price equation, which just identifies the equation.  The other 17 equations 
in the system are identified in the same way. 
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B. Exogeneity of EZ 
Up to this point, we have assumed that the designation of a neighborhood for EZ status is 
exogenous conditional on the other observed variables.  This is a dubious assumption.  Greenbaum 
and Bondonio (2004) show that EZs are less populated; are poorer; have more minorities, 
unemployment and renters; and have depressed housing values.  Wallace (2003, 2004) shows that – 
conditional on applying to become an EZ – an area was more likely to be designated an EZ if it was 
closer to the urban center, had higher poverty or was in a state with less experience with enterprise 
zones or more experience applying for federal funds.  Wallace (2004) also shows that the makeup of 
the area’s congressional delegation also matters.   
This non-random selection of EZs has been an important problem for researchers studying 
their effects.  In the context of state programs, Greenbaum and Engberg (2000) use propensity scores 
to select a comparable sample of zip codes for comparison of the effects of targeted incentives and 
compare the effects of actual zone selection versus zip code characteristics.  They find that on 
average, enterprise zones became worse, relative to non-zones, over the 1980’s, but that once you 
control for area characteristics, the effects of being in a zone were mostly insignificant. Elvery 
(2004) uses propensity score matching and, after considerable effort, is able to get the estimated 
effect of being in the Florida or California state enterprise zone programs back up to insignificant. 
(More naïve estimates suggested negative effects.)  The possibility that program administrators are 
less likely to spend valuable resources on areas that are likely to have substantial rejuvenation in the 
absence of the program suggests that a naïve estimate of the EZ program’s effects will produce 
downward biased effects if the special nature of the treatment group is ignored.  In this analysis, we 
address this problem in three ways. 
The first way that the problem is addressed is through the differencing outlined above.  If 
unobserved area characteristics are causing housing prices to be lower, residents to be less 
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employable and housing to be less well-maintained, the first-differencing of all the equations and the 
resultant focus on changes will get rid of these effects.   
If EZ status is granted to areas where unobserved factors are causing a relative stagnation in a 
neighborhood, however, then even the first-difference coefficients will be biased down.  If there is 
something about the EZ neighborhoods that is causing them to become worse, degrading the housing 
stock and impoverishing the residents (relative to other neighborhoods), then leaving this factor out 
will bias our results.  In a study that is national in scope, it is impossible to directly control for all 
these factors.  Our second tactic is to seek out a comparison group that could reasonably be assumed 
to share trends in most of these unobserved factors and compare the EZ group to this comparison 
group. 
To this end, we use the timing of the EZ program to identify such a group.  Neighborhoods 
were granted EZ status in three waves: Round 1 in 1994, Round 2 in 1998 and Round 3 in 2001.  It 
is reasonable to assume that the neighborhoods that entered the EZ program in these three waves are 
similar in the unobservable qualities that may negatively impact property values, neighborhood 
demographics and the upkeep of the neighborhood housing stock.  However, our data period ends in 
April 2000, when the 2000 census was conducted.  It is unreasonable to expect that selection into the 
2001 round of EZ designation would have any causal effect on 1990-2000 trends in housing values, 
neighborhood demographics or housing stock.6  Thus, we take the experiences of the Round 3 EZ 
neighborhoods as representing the counterfactual of what would have happened to the Round 1 EZ 
neighborhoods had the policy intervention not occurred, conditional on observables and time-
invariant unobservables.  Our empirical equations consider EZ as a vector of EZ1, EZ2 and EZever, 
which indicate participation in Round 1, Round 2, or any round of the EZ, respectively.  The 
6 The legislation enabling the third round of Empowerment Zones did not pass the legislature until Dec. 21st, 2000.  
Workshops for interested applicant jurisdictions occurred in June, 2001.  Selection occurred on the last day of 2001, with 
the designation becoming effective the next day.  Given this timeline, it is unlikely that even expectation effects could 
have increased prices in early 2000 in Round 3 EZs. 
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coefficient for EZ1 can thus be interpreted as deviations from the control group, or the “program 
effect” of EZ selection. 
The validity of this approach rests on the equivalence of the “unobserved effect” for the 
Round 1 and Round 3 EZ neighborhoods.7  The approach is valid whether HUD administrators 
attempted to use the program to help especially distressed neighborhoods, or whether they attempted 
to pick neighborhoods that were likely to rebound on their own to make the program look successful.  
If the decision rule (concerning the unobserved factors) changed between 1994 and 2001, the 
approach will fail to control for policy endogeneity.  Similarly, if designation as a zone tends to 
immediately follow recent unobservable neighborhood decay, the identification strategy will 
overstate the effect of the program.  Obviously, this cannot be directly tested.  Greenbaum and 
Bondonio (2004) compare the tracts selected in the three rounds and find that Round 3 and Round 1 
census tracts are not significantly different in median income and in value of owner-occupied 
housing, although they differ in many other (observable) respects.8  They also show that the 
relationship between the probability of selection into an EZ and various observable characteristics 
differed between rounds and that in the later rounds selection appears to depend less on observable 
characteristics.9   
In our data, across the 17 neighborhood-level variables we examine, the difference in the 
changes experienced over the 1980’s for Round 1 and Round 3 neighborhoods are statistically 
different from one another for nine (eleven) variables at the 0.05 (0.1) significance level.  While 
these differences are statistically significant, they are generally substantively small.  The difference 
7 It bears emphasis that if unobserved factors in levels differ, they will be differenced out.  Only difference in the changes 
in unobserved factors will affect our results. 
8 It should be stressed that while the statistical significance of these difference is often extreme, the substantive 
differences are less extreme except in the case of population density.  Round 3 EZ neighborhoods still have relatively 
high unemployment, poverty and minority rates and low education, rental and ownership rates.   
9 This last result could be arising because the selection process was becoming more focused on the unobservables, or 
because the selection process was becoming more random. 
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between Round 1 and Round 3 1980s changes is greater than half a standard deviation in only one 
case (population density) and is less than a tenth of a standard deviation for nine of the variables.  In 
our empirical section, the control variables will take care of the variables that differ in observable 
ways between Round 1 and Round 3 EZs.  We will have to hope that any remaining unobserved 
“distressed neighborhood” effect is time-invariant and washed away in the first-differencing or that 
the time-varying unobservable effect is the same for Round 1 and Round 3 EZs.  That these 
assumptions are reasonable is supported by the fact that, controlling for metropolitan fixed effects, 
there is no significant difference between the appreciation rates of median home values over the 
1980s between the two groups of block groups.  The similarity in price movements during the 1980s 
is consistent with the assumptions that, absent the federal intervention, the experiences in the 1990s 
would also have been similar.   
Out of an abundance of caution, we also explore another approach to the possible 
endogeneity of EZ designation.  Because of our simultaneous equation setting, the propensity score 
methods used by Busso and Kline (2008) are not available to us.  Instead, we take Hanson (2008) as 
inspiration in attempting to generate instrument for the designation of a neighborhood as an 
Empowerment Zone in the first round.   In an auxiliary regression, we use a probit model to predict 
the first-round designation decision with information about the neighborhood’s congressional 
delegation and other predetermined variables known to HUD at the time of designation.10  From this 
analysis, we generate the neighborhood-specific probability of designation, EˆZ , and enter this fitted 
value into the system of equations described above in lieu of EZ.  As will become apparent below, 
10 The regressors used in this auxiliary probit are predetermined or use data measured before 1994.  This includes lagged 
differences (1980-1990) and twice-lagged levels (1980) in the S and N and M vectors (see Table 1), with the exception of 
school district spending which was unavailable for 1980.  The vector of congressional variables has zone-level measures 
of years of seniority of the most senior Senator; total seniority of senators; number of senators on Appropriations 
committee and the number of senators of the majority party on that committee; number of senators on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs committee, number of majority party senators on that committee and number of senators chairing that 
committee; a count of representatives for that zone and a count of democrat representatives for that zone. 
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the results based on this additional analysis do not lead us to worry about out preferred identification 
strategy.   
   
C. Data 
The hedonic approach generally uses cross-sectional data to predict housing prices.  A 
national database of individual home prices would be required to analyze a national program such as 
Empowerment Zones in this way.  Such a database is not available, so we are forced to use 
neighborhood averages as proxies for these individual values.  Using aggregated data limits the 
inferences that can be made about micro-level effects.  Nonetheless, some hedonic research has 
shown that estimates using aggregate data produce reasonably accurate results (Freeman 1979, 
Nelson 1979, O’Byrne et al. 1985).11  Noonan et al. (2007) also find generally plausible implicit 
prices in OLS estimations using similar aggregated data.  Moreover, the median housing value in a 
neighborhood (and other demographic variables) is quite important from a policy perspective.  
Estimates of the effects of the EZ program on neighborhood measures are informative in their own 
right, even if they cannot be strictly interpreted as hedonic prices.  Viewed in an epidemiological 
light, the effects of average policy treatments on average outcomes are perhaps less than ideal but 
still interesting.   
An advantage of our data is that these neighborhood averages can be observed over time.  
We use neighborhood aggregate data to estimate the system of equations described in part A.  We 
use block-group level census data for the census years 1980, 1990 and 2000 from Geolytics®, Inc., 
which processes the data into constant census 2000 geographies.  The constant geographies allow us 
11 See Shultz and King (2001) for additional review of the use of aggregated Census data in hedonics.  Greenstone and 
Gallagher (2008) use a similar data set for their analysis of superfund designation, although they use the larger 
geography of the census tract.  
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to take the neighborhood (block group) as the unit of observation and observe developing 
neighborhood outcomes as time elapses.   
There are four types of variables in the empirical model sketched in subsection A: P, N, S 
and M.  P is measured with the log of the median housing value as reported in the census long form.  
The neighborhood composition variables, N, include the proportion of families with at least one 
worker, the proportion of households with incomes at or below 150 percent of the poverty line, the 
log of median household income, the proportion of people reported as being white and non-Hispanic, 
the average commute time for workers, the population density, the proportion employed in 
manufacturing industries, the proportion of households who rent their property, the proportion of the 
population that lived in the same home five years prior to the census, the proportion of households 
that have children and the proportion of the population aged over 25 with a college degree.  These 
variables were chosen either because they have been shown in hedonic studies to affect housing 
values (e.g., population density, percent white), or because they are variables of special interest in 
the local economic development literature (e.g., percent working families).  All these variables are 
measured as changes from 1990 to 2000. 
The housing stock variables, S, include the vacancy rate of neighborhood housing units; the 
median year built; the proportion of neighborhood housing units that are in buildings with four or 
fewer units; the average number of rooms; the average number of bedrooms and the percent of the 
housing stock built within the previous decade.12  These are most of the relevant variables included 
in the census long form.  With the exception of new construction, all these variables are measured as 
changes from 1990 to 2000.   
12 The proportion of housing units constructed since the last census enters the S  vector directly, capturing the flow of 
housing construction activity in the block group in ways that perhaps median year built does not.  Roughly speaking, the 
new construction variable is the number of housing units, first-differenced as with all other variables and scaled so it is a 
proportion variable.   
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The variables discussed thus far are all endogenous: they are part of the system of equations.  
We also include several exogenous variables.  The municipal-level variables, M, include measures 
derived from the census defined place containing the neighborhood.13  These measures include the 
place population, median income, housing value and rental rate (all logged), the proportion of 
families that have children and families that are “traditional families” with children.  These variables 
are meant to capture the municipality’s tax base (income, housing values, rents and household count) 
and service provisions (the family variables).  We also include a variable derived from the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) School District Demographic System (SDDS) and the 1992 
and 2002 Census of Governments measuring per pupil expenditure in the elementary or unified 
school district that contains the centroid of the block group as a measure of public service quality.  
These variables are measured as changes from 1990 to 2000.14  MSA fixed effects are included in all 
the results reported below.  In the P equation we also include a county-level natural amenity score 
(USDA 1999) and the interaction of the MSA fixed effect with the distance to the nearest historical 
city center.15  As time-invariant geographic attributes, these variables enter the structural model 
interacted with time, thus relaxing the assumption of constant hedonic prices over time for these 
characteristics.  Importantly, the addition of MSA fixed effects allows metropolitan areas to have 
idiosyncratic average appreciation rates, and we identify all our effects off intra-metropolitan 
variation.   
Finally, our variable of interest, EZ, includes three dummy variables.  These variables 
indicate when, if ever, the block group was included in the EZ program.  (Block-groups could be 
13 The place is the census’s closest approximation of the municipal or jurisdictional geography.  For areas falling outside 
any place, the county-level values are used, since such areas will presumably get their services from a county 
government instead of a municipal government. 
14 These place-level variables are considered exogenous on the logic that any one block group will make up a small-
enough proportion of the place that it has negligible effect on place-level averages. 
15 The exclusion of these exogenous factors from the non-price equations supplies us with hundreds of additional 
exclusion restrictions raising the risk of overidentification.     
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selected at most once in Rounds 1, 2, or 3.)  EZ comprises two dummy variables (EZ1 and EZ2), 
equaling one if the block group fell into the first or second round and a third dummy variable 
(EZever) that equals one if the block group was ever in an EZ, including the post-2000 census Round 
3.  EZ1 and EZ2 can be interpreted as changes in EZ status over the course of the 1990’s, while the 
variable EZever is merely a control variable, as discussed above.  The interpretations of the 
coefficients on EZ1 and EZ2 is thus the effect these variables have on the dependent variables, 
controlling for the fact that they have the unobserved “distressed” characteristic, as represented by 
the EZever variable.    
Table 1 presents the average changes for all the variables for which we report results.  This 
table presents averages for the full sample of metropolitan block groups and the sub-sample average 
changes for block groups in each round of EZs.  It is worth noting the strong appreciation of Round 
1 Empowerment Zones and the weak appreciation of Round 3 Empowerment Zones; Round 1 zones 
appreciated over 35% faster in the 1990s.  This is a pattern that is preserved in the regression results 
reported below. 
 
IV.  Results 
Table 2 presents our OLS estimates of the direct and full effects of EZ designation.  Besides the 
variables reported in these tables, we are controlling for metropolitan fixed effects (by measuring all 
variables as differences from metropolitan averages) as well as city-specific “rent gradients” and 
county-level natural amenity scores.  In column 2.1, we see the that controlling for metropolitan 
fixed effects, some time-invariant geographical factors, place-level variables and neighborhood-level 
controls reduces the effect of EZ Round 1 designation relative to the conditional means presented in 
Table 1, but the effects are still quite large.  The coefficient of about 0.22 implies that median home 
value appreciation was about 25% faster in Round 1 neighborhoods relative to what would have 
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occurred without the program.  None of the control variables are particularly surprising in their sign.  
Column 2.2 reports results when the endogenous variables are dropped.  By not holding these 
variables constant, we allow the indirect effects of EZ designation that might have worked through 
these neighborhood characteristics to be included in the coefficient of EZ Round 1.  However, the 
effect on the coefficient is tiny; the coefficients are identical through the fourth significant digit!  
This suggests that the indirect effects are small or offsetting.   
 The large program effect could be explained by endogenous choice of Round 1 zones.  
Columns 2.3 and 2.4 report results from OLS regressions run with the predicted probability of 
Round 1 designation in the place of the vector of program controls used for identification in the first 
two columns.  While the standard errors of these coefficients are biased downward, it is not likely to 
affect the outcome of any hypothesis tests: the coefficients using this two-step procedure are much 
larger than those using the Round 3 zones as a control group and the qualitative difference between 
the direct and full effects are similar whichever identification strategy is used.  These results increase 
our confidence in our preferred identification strategy that – if anything – appears to be conservative.  
It bears emphasis that these price effects are in line with the most current research on the federal EZ 
program, presented in Busso and Kline (2008) and Hanson (2008), both of which report substantial 
property value effects.   
 There are at least four reasons why the program effects in Table 2 appear so much larger than 
those in Greenbaum and Engberg (2000) and other appraisals of state enterprise zone programs.  
First, and most obviously, the EZ program differed from most state programs in that it offered not 
only tax incentives but substantial grants.  The influx of federal dollars and the services and 
community improvements that can be achieved with that spending may have a larger effect on land 
values (or other variables) than tax incentives alone.  Second, the fact that the EZ program is federal 
and included federal tax incentives (usually on top of state and local incentives) probably means that 
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the tax incentives were stronger than in state enterprise zones.  Also, the federal EZ program may 
have gotten better publicity in local media, helping businesses become aware of the potential 
benefits.  Finally, there are measurement issues that suggest the difference between these results and 
previous results may be (slightly) over-stated.  Most previous studies have been forced to use zip 
codes for information on employment, or other neighborhood outcomes.  Zip code boundaries do not 
match well with state enterprise zone boundaries.  Even if a study uses census tract or block group 
data, state enterprise zones were not drawn according to census geographies.   Researchers are forced 
to assign zone status to partially designated zip codes (or census tracts) according to some decision 
rule.  However justifiable that decision rule is, it will mean that the independent variable “enterprise 
zone” is measured with error, biasing the coefficient towards zero.  With the federal Empowerment 
Zone program, zone boundaries were drawn to match very closely to 1990 census geographies.  
Thus, the measure of program status we are able to obtain for the federal program is relatively error 
free.  This eliminates a downward bias that is present in most state enterprise zone studies. 
 Table 3 presents the results of the three-stage least-squares estimation described above.  
Column 3.1 presents the results when identifying EZ program effects with the comparison group of 
EZ Round 3 neighborhoods.  Column 3.2 reports the results using the auxiliary regression to identify 
the effects.  Within each column, there are two sub-columns.  In the first, the coefficients from the 
price equation are reported.  In the second, the coefficient on the EZ Round 1 variable in each of the 
other second-stage equations is reported.  Referring back to equation (4), the first columns report all 
of the β coefficients, while the second columns present the γEZ and δEZ coefficients from the non-
price equations that are estimated simultaneously in the same model.  The other γ and δ coefficients 
are too numerous to present here, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
Table 3 shows that controlling for the various simultaneous relationships between the 
endogenous variables increases the point estimates of the EZ program effect to about 40%.  In 
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column 3.2 we see the estimated effect is even higher at over 60% when identified using the 
auxiliary regression.   The coefficient on EZ ever suggests that had the Round 1 zone neighborhoods 
not been in the program, median property values would have fallen by almost 20% instead of 
increasing by about 20%.   
The two identification strategies are in substantial agreement on the EZ program’s effects on 
non-price neighborhood characteristics as well.  For eight variables, the identification strategies yield 
qualitatively similar results (although the effect sizes tend to be much larger in column 3.2).  These 
effects included increases in the percentage of families with working adults, the poverty rate, the 
percent white, the percent of households with at least one child and the percent of new construction 
in the neighborhood.  They also include decreases in population density, the median year built and 
the average number of rooms in occupied housing units.  Of the seven variables with insignificant 
program effects in one of the specifications, the point estimates are at least of the same sign for five 
of them (positive for median income, average commute, vacancy rate and proportion long term 
residents; negative for percent of workers employed in industry).  Only two variables have 
significant estimated program effects of opposite sign across the two specifications (proportion with 
college degrees and average number of bedrooms).  We would characterize these effects as mixed, 
based on our understanding of the goals of the policy.  Whether these non-price effects are beneficial 
on net depends on how the effected characteristics are valued in the housing market.  
 The coefficients of the other endogenous variables in the price equation bear some 
discussion.  First, many of the coefficients are large in the 3SLS models.  The scale of the 
independent variables must be kept in mind when interpreting the size of the coefficients. The 
coefficient of over 4 for the proportion of small housing structures may sound large, but this means 
that a one percentage point increase in the proportion is associated with a 4 percent increase in 
median housing values.  Perhaps only for the average rooms variables and the population density 
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variable are the coefficients suspiciously large.   Across the two models in Table 3, there is 
substantial agreement about the sign and rough magnitude of the effects.  While some of these 
effects (and their changes from the OLS specification) are interesting in their own right, we note 
that, with a few exceptions, they match intuition well.     
 In Table 4, we add a control for areas bordering the EZ neighborhoods.  There are two 
reasons to do this.  First, observing the spill-over effects is interesting in its own right.  Whether 
spatially targeted programs also benefit nearby areas (or impose costs on them) is an important 
dimension of evaluating the effects of such programs.  Second, the inclusion of these affected areas 
in the control groups could potentially bias our estimates of the program effects.  Table 4 reports the 
endogenous and program variables for models including half-mile buffers around the zone 
neighborhoods for each round.16  We see that estimated spill-over effects of the program on 
residential housing prices is positive and that the inclusion of these controls does not substantially 
change the estimated program effects within the round one empowerment zones in either the OLS 
model (column 4.1) or the 2SLS specification (column 4.2).        
  With these results in hand – and the empirical model laid out in Section III.A – it is possible 
to calculate the full effects of Empowerment Zone status in two ways.  First, with the OLS models 
we can compare the ceteris paribus or “direct” program effect reported in columns 2.1, 2.3 and 4.1 
with the mutatis mutandis or “full” program effects reported in columns 2.2 and 2.4 and to a parallel 
specification with buffers which was not reported.  Second, by plugging the coefficients from the 
price equation and the other equations into an expanded equation (6), we can calculate the full effect 
and compare it to the direct effect for each of the 3 estimates of the system presented in equation (4).  
The results of these exercises are reported in Table 5, which reports the direct and full effects.  The 
16 These control variables are measured as the percent of the block group that is within one half mile of an Empowerment 
Zone in the different rounds. 
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indirect effect is computed from the difference of these effects.  A final column compares the 
indirect effect to the standard error of the direct effect.  While this last column is not appropriate for 
hypothesis testing, it gives some sense of our computed indirect effects in light of our uncertainty 
about the parameter estimates and it is available for all six of our models.  The results are fairly 
consistent across models; indirect effects are insignificant in the OLS models and negative in the 
2SLS models.  In the case of the simultaneous equations estimation with spill-over effects, the 
indirect effect is quite large in magnitude, suggesting that the program effects substantially crowd 
themselves out.  We find these results striking in light of the goals and rationale of the policy.  
Empowerment Zones were not billed as property value enhancement programs.  Instead, they were 
understood as attempts to affect neighborhoods for the better across a number of dimensions.  One 
would thus expect that the direct effects of Empowerment Zone interventions would be minimal, but 
that the indirect effects would be large.  To the extent that the results in Table 5 tell a story, it is the 
exact opposite one.  Across all models, the direct effects are very large.  On the other hand, the 
indirect effects are either quite small by comparison (estimated in OLS), or actually negative 
(estimated in the systems of equations).  The consistency of this story is striking; there are no results 
pointing towards large positive indirect effects.     
  
V. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the effects of a very generous economic development policy: the federal 
Empowerment Zone program.  This program offers the best chance to find positive effects of 
spatially targeted economic development policies because on top of the state and local tax 
incentives, federal tax incentives and direct federal investment is added.   
 This paper contributes to the literature because it is one of the first attempts to explicitly 
account for the complex, interacting processes which generate neighborhood measures like home 
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values, demographic characteristics and housing stock characteristics.  While the equations we 
estimate are admittedly reduced form, the system of equations approach allows for a much richer 
picture of neighborhood outcomes to emerge.   
 Although studies of state enterprise zones have struggled to find significant effects, we find a 
sizeable and significant positive effect on home values and varying effects on other outcomes of 
interest.  The significance and size of these effects are probably explained by the generosity of the 
federal program, along with better measurement of program status because of the close matching of 
EZ boundaries with census geographies.  The indirect effects of EZ status on home prices through 
the other endogenous variables appear to be either extremely small or actually perverse.  These 
results fit well into the existing literature on spatially targeted economic development programs.  
The recent literature on state programs (e.g. Bondonio and Greenbaum 2007), which rely completely 
on tax incentives, has shown them on net to be ineffective.  Moreover, the developing literature on 
the effects of the federal program (Oakley and Tsao 2006, 2007a, b) finds generally unimpressive 
effects of the intervention on neighborhood indicators other than price.  The results in this paper 
suggest that the federal grants are able to affect local quality of life with complex and not generally 
positive net effects on other neighborhood attributes.   
 We believe that these results raise questions about what the federal Empowerment Zone 
program has accomplished and how.  The strong positive direct effect suggests the program is 
working, perhaps through improved amenities (better services, lower crime, better infrastructure or 
better access to employment).  Another possibility is that the positive increase in price represents a 
composition effect.  Density decreases in these neighborhoods.  A possible interpretation is that 
federal money is being spent to knock down low-value homes, increasing the median value in a 
neighborhood.  Such an intervention would provide little beneficial neighborhood revitalization and 
so we see the non-price effects of the program are extremely mixed.  While this is possible, the sheer 
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size of the EZ1 effect makes it unlikely that this is the only explanation.  Some recent work by 
Lynch and Zax (2008) on the state program in Colorado suggests that some of the increased real 
estate prices could come through increased demand for commercial real estate (in order to gain 
access to program benefits) driving up the price of residential property.  This interpretation is also 
adopted by Landers (2006) for Ohio’s state program and Hanson (2008) in the context of the federal 
program.  We find the positive spill-over effects and the scattered beneficial non-price effects of the 
program to be evidence suggestive that something more than simple capitalization of benefits to 
business has transpired in these neighborhoods, although these effects certainly do not preclude this 
interpretation.   
 Another aspect worth examining is program heterogeneity.  While this paper has 
concentrated on the average effect of the policy intervention, Oakley and Tsao (2006) show that 
there is some heterogeneity across Empowerment Zones in terms of the non-price effects of the 
program.  This is to be expected since the actual policy intervention in each zone would differ 
according to the zone’s administration, goals and strategies.  Whether differences in policy outcomes 
are correlated with differences in the policy implementation in a sensible way is an interesting 
question.  The identification strategy used here would not be appropriate for such an examination.   
 Further work might also be done on the indirect effects of EZ status on the other variables.  
Two variables of interest are the family labor market variable and the poverty rate. Both are targets 
of the program and have been hypothesized to have positive externality effects in neighborhoods.  
The Empowerment Zone program seemed to have conflicting effects on these variables (increasing 
working families and poverty simultaneously).  However, several other variables affected by the EZ 
program also affected labor market success and poverty outcomes, so the full effects might differ 
markedly from the direct effects of the program and may be more consistent across neighborhood 
characteristics.   
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 Spatially-targeted economic development programs are an important feature in the landscape 
of social policy in America.  Because much of the cost of these programs is off the books, they are 
popular.  The suite of policies at local, state and federal levels create considerable variation in the 
intensiveness of these interventions.  Considerable effort has been and will continue to be directed 
towards understanding the effects of these policies and what works.  To that end, this paper can be 
seen as adding to the literature in examining the effects of a very generous program.  At the same 
time, these policy-induced variations in taxes and expenditures represent an opportunity to examine 
the forces affecting neighborhood change along a host of measurable dimensions.  From that 
perspective, the differences in results across programs (state, federal) and across dimensions (price, 
non-price) offer insight into neighborhood dynamics and the workings of the various housing sub-
markets in metropolitan areas.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 1990’s changes, main variables. 
  Sample 
  All Metro Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
EZ 
Round 1 EZ 0.0084 960a 0 0 
Round 2 EZ 0.0086 0 987a 0 
Round 3 EZ 0.0057 0 0 656a 
P log median home value 0.3900 0.6278 0.3967 0.2672  0.3210 0.5934 0.4019 0.3538 
N 
prop. working families 0.0046 0.0865 0.0352 0.0390 
 0.0957 0.1741 0.1489 0.1467 
150% poverty rate 0.0006 -0.0377 -0.0230 -0.0307 
 0.1058 0.1909 0.1395 0.1713 
log median income 0.3342 0.4513 0.3534 0.4041 
 0.2497 0.4717 0.3175 0.3952 
proportion White -0.0817 -0.0274 -0.0584 -0.0582 
 0.1202 0.1162 0.1165 0.1357 
Avg. Commute (minutes) 1.7811 1.8433 1.9511 1.6789 
 4.9916 10.5922 7.0959 6.6937 
Population Density 280.47 -512.52 -580.46 -136.75 
 2372.7 4527.1 8146.8 1990.9 
prop. Industrial employment -0.0624 -0.0776 -0.0612 -0.0465 
 0.0893 0.1661 0.1092 0.1177 
prop. Renters -0.0068 -0.0244 -0.0091 0.0092 
 0.1087 0.1528 0.1119 0.1441 
prop. 5-yr resident 0.0240 0.0117 -0.0039 0.0089 
 0.1334 0.1764 0.1360 0.1522 
prop. w/children -0.0013 0.0054 -0.0021 -0.0047 
 0.0666 0.1023 0.0816 0.0958 
prop, with college (25+) 0.0514 0.0316 0.0341 0.0242 
 0.0891 0.0967 0.0966 0.0790 
S 
prop. vacant -0.0129 -0.0159 0.0024 -0.0253 
 0.0699 0.1316 0.0961 0.1150 
median year built 3.7454 1.6768 9.7692 3.8086 
 31.656 9.388 97.050 19.652 
prop. smaller structures (<4 units) 0.0044 0.0318 0.0169 0.0144 
 0.1076 0.1479 0.1202 0.1249 
Avg. Rooms 0.0641 0.0401 0.0638 0.0789 
 0.5041 0.7512 0.5514 0.6116 
Avg. Bedrooms 0.0097 -0.0025 0.0091 -0.0129 
 0.2725 0.4432 0.3058 0.3513 
Prop. housing built in 10 yearsb 0.1434 0.0546 0.0555 0.0569 
 0.1877 0.0942 0.0949 0.0949 
M 
Place: log of Housholds 0.1408 0.0007 0.0335 0.1361 
 0.1539 0.0624 0.1004 0.0368 
Place: log of Median Home Value 0.3784 0.4272 0.3506 0.2807 
 0.2072 0.3419 0.1242 0.0815 
Place: log of Median Rent 0.0836 0.0632 0.0599 0.0444 
 0.1200 0.1113 0.0894 0.0858 
Place: log of median income 0.2829 0.2799 0.2633 0.2693 
 0.0895 0.1236 0.0583 0.0479 
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Place: prop. w/children -0.0069 0.0088 -0.0086 -0.0080 
 0.0285 0.0197 0.0337 0.0145 
Place: prop. families w/children -0.0203 0.0028 -0.0206 -0.0246 
 0.0278 0.0155 0.0312 0.0143 
District: log expend per pupil. 0.5007 0.5270 0.4594 0.5221 
 0.2093 0.0873 0.1805 0.2034 
 No. Obs (all variables)c 109,905 749 846 608 
Note: Mean and standard deviation (reported below the mean) of variable changes, 1990-2000. 
a. Numbers for “average” values of the Zone variables are counts of block groups for which the specified variables are 
equal to one.  All other variables are means, with standard deviations in smaller print below.   
b.  Average is reported in levels, not differences.  This variable is also entered into the regressions in levels. 
c. The Number of Observations row represents the minimum number of observations across all variables. 
   
 
 Table 2: OLS estimates. 
             
 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
 Coef.     se Coef.     se Coef.     se Coef.     se 
EZ Round 1 0.2211 *** 0.0254 0.2211 *** 0.0260 0.4020 *** 0.0433 0.4272 *** 0.0435 
EZ Round 2 0.0391 * 0.0205 0.0276  0.0211       
EZ ever -0.0218  0.0149 -0.0050  0.0155       
Working Families -0.0056  0.0141    -0.0100  0.0137    
Poverty (150%) -0.0229  0.0132    -0.0279 ** 0.0131    
log(med. Inc) 0.1294 *** 0.0069    0.1283 *** 0.0068    
White 0.1502 *** 0.0085    0.1401 *** 0.0085    
Commute -0.0004 * 0.0002    -0.0005 ** 0.0002    
Pop. Density 1.59×10-06 ** 7.65×10-07    2.17×10-06 ** 8.94×10-07    
Industrial Employment -0.0191  0.0117    -0.0131  0.0116    
Renters 0.0134  0.0169    0.0032  0.0168    
Long Term Resident -0.1368 *** 0.0075    -0.1357 *** 0.0075    
Families with Children -0.0088  0.0169    -0.0073  0.0170    
College 0.3053 *** 0.0130    0.3086 *** 0.0129    
Vacancy Rate -0.0238  0.0196    -0.0163  0.0192    
med. Year Built 0.0014 *** 0.0001    0.0014 *** 0.0001    
Small Structures -0.1070 *** 0.0160    -0.1141 *** 0.0159    
Avg. Rooms 0.0937 *** 0.0036    0.0955 *** 0.0036    
Avg. Bedrooms -0.0245 *** 0.0069    -0.0275 *** 0.0069    
Construction 0.0600 *** 0.0065    0.0651 *** 0.0067    
Place Households -0.1162 *** 0.0076 -0.0516 *** 0.0080 -0.1090 *** 0.0076 -0.0427 *** 0.0080 
Place log median Value 0.5379 *** 0.0121 0.5671 *** 0.0124 0.5301 *** 0.0123 0.5597 *** 0.0125 
Place log median Rent 0.0968 *** 0.0083 0.1332 *** 0.0093 0.1074 *** 0.0084 0.1434 *** 0.0094 
Place log median income -0.0021  0.0153 0.1350 *** 0.0162 -0.0048  0.0152 0.1304 *** 0.0160 
Place families with children -0.3902 *** 0.0716 -0.8698 *** 0.0750 -0.3537 *** 0.0664 -0.8027 *** 0.0686 
Place traditional families 0.3963 *** 0.0725 0.8986 *** 0.0786 0.3366 *** 0.0669 0.8222 *** 0.0720 
Place expenditure/Pupil 0.0053  0.0043 0.0103 ** 0.0045 0.0062  0.0043 0.0122 *** 0.0046 
Observations 106,259 106,957 104,827 104,849 
r-squared 0.1873 0.082 0.1881 0.0852 
Note: All models also include MSA fixed effects, county-level natural amenity score and MSA-specific rent gradients . ***, **, * for p<0.01, <0.05, <0.10, respectively 
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Table 3:  Three stage least squares models: Price equation and EZ Round 1 coefficients from non-price equations. 
             
 3.1 3.2 
 Price equation Non-price equations Price equation Non-price equations 
 Coef.  se EZ1 Coef.  se Coef.  se EZ1 Coef.  se 
EZ Round 1 0.3458 *** 0.0296    0.4895 *** 0.0399    
EZ Round 2 0.2883 *** 0.0360          
EZ ever -0.1984 *** 0.0251          
lagged Housing values 0.1454 *** 0.0309    0.0705 ** 0.0313    
Working Families -1.0078 *** 0.2920 0.0439 *** 0.0073 -0.8917 *** 0.2946 0.1095 *** 0.0102 
Poverty (150%) -1.2709 *** 0.2204 0.0259 *** 0.0059 -3.0086 *** 0.2180 0.0742 *** 0.0089 
log(med. Inc) 0.9833 *** 0.2096 0.0042  0.0132 0.2725  0.2123 0.0500 ** 0.0199 
White -1.3906 *** 0.0586 0.0804 *** 0.0119 -1.4209 *** 0.0582 0.2182 *** 0.0176 
Commute -0.0315 *** 0.0054 0.2040  0.3472 -0.0538 *** 0.0054 1.0212 ** 0.5139 
Pop. Density -0.0354 *** 0.0067 -0.5590 *** 0.1392 0.0816 *** 0.0081 -2.1289 *** 0.1728 
Industrial Employment -1.3176 *** 0.1150 -0.0073  0.0072 -0.2592 ** 0.1208 -0.1580 *** 0.0101 
Renters 3.1169 *** 0.4363 -0.0237 *** 0.0061 1.6915 *** 0.4640 0.0013  0.0092 
Long Term Resident 0.3351 * 0.1739 0.0060  0.0095 0.2010  0.1725 0.1052 *** 0.0140 
Families with Children 1.3279 *** 0.4503 0.0239 *** 0.0044 -0.6417  0.4575 0.1113 *** 0.0064 
College 1.9797 *** 0.0936 -0.0257 *** 0.0076 1.4849 *** 0.0928 0.0245 ** 0.0115 
Vacancy Rate -0.7783 *** 0.1964 0.0128 *** 0.0048 -0.2926  0.1936 0.0089  0.0073 
med. Year Built -0.0081 *** 0.0015 -1.5928 ** 0.7915 -0.0035 ** 0.0015 -10.1993 *** 1.1945 
Small Structures 4.3845 *** 0.4260 -0.0069  0.0057 2.3475 *** 0.4776 0.0606 *** 0.0083 
Avg. Rooms 0.9838 *** 0.0545 -0.0626 *** 0.0227 1.3029 *** 0.0560 -0.1620 *** 0.0326 
Avg. Bedrooms -4.0112 *** 0.3170 0.0273 ** 0.0108 -3.9269 *** 0.3479 -0.0581 *** 0.0159 
Construction 1.1707 *** 0.1242 0.0485 *** 0.0120 0.3183 ** 0.1357 0.3520 *** 0.0174 
Place Households -0.1818 *** 0.0228    -0.0056  0.0232    
Place log median Value 0.6433 *** 0.0191    0.6014 *** 0.0193    
Place log median Rent -0.0134  0.0173    0.0064  0.0168    
Place log median income -0.2226 *** 0.0431    -0.1897 *** 0.0409    
Place families with children -0.7608 *** 0.2318    0.1073  0.2305    
Place traditional families -0.0178  0.1763    -0.1916  0.1721    
Place expenditure/Pupil 0.0157 ** 0.0074    0.0146 ** 0.0071    
observations 105,332      104,827      
Note: All models include MSA fixed effects; P equation also includes city-specific rent gradients and a county-level natural amenity score.  ***, **, * for p<0.01, <0.05, <0.10, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: OLS and 2SLS estimates with spill-overs 
          
 Column 4.1 Column 4.2 
 Price equation Price equation Non-price equations 
 Coef.  se Coef.  se EZ1 Coef.  se 
EZ Round 1 0.2307 *** 0.0255 0.3922 *** 0.0292    
EZ Round 2 0.0450 ** 0.0207 0.3055 *** 0.0387    
EZ ever -0.0242  0.0152 -0.2235 *** 0.0274    
EZ Round 1 buffer 0.1510 *** 0.0226 0.1853 *** 0.0283    
EZ Round 2 buffer 0.0255  0.0202 0.0996 *** 0.0352    
EZ ever buffer -0.0150  0.0153 -0.1379 *** 0.0274    
lagged Housing values    0.1113 *** 0.0299    
Working Families -0.0099  0.0141 -0.8598 *** 0.2990 0.0462 *** 0.0074 
Poverty (150%) -0.0238 * 0.0132 -1.7478 *** 0.2158 0.0307 *** 0.0060 
log(med. Inc) 0.1286 *** 0.0069 0.7221 *** 0.2254 0.0115  0.0134 
White 0.1467 *** 0.0085 -1.3487 *** 0.0546 0.0926 *** 0.0120 
Commute -0.0004 * 0.0002 -0.0372 *** 0.0052 0.2521  0.3540 
Pop. Density 1.53×10-06 ** 7.65×10-07 -0.0028  0.0063 -0.6950 *** 0.1416 
Industrial Employment -0.0179  0.0117 -0.9502 *** 0.1079 -0.0113  0.0074 
Renters 0.0128  0.0169 2.2092 *** 0.4765 -0.2365 *** 0.0546 
Long Term Resident -0.1370 *** 0.0075 0.2420  0.1770 0.0158  0.0097 
Families with Children -0.0080  0.0169 0.4846  0.4689 0.0303 *** 0.0045 
College 0.3098 *** 0.0131 1.7322 *** 0.0877 -0.0286 *** 0.0078 
Vacancy Rate -0.0237  0.0196 -0.6882 *** 0.1858 0.0139 *** 0.0049 
med. Year Built 0.0014 *** 0.0001 -0.0059 *** 0.0016 -2.3788 *** 0.8037 
Small structures -0.1104 *** 0.0160 3.4074 *** 0.4735 -0.0003  0.0058 
Avg. Rooms 0.0941 *** 0.0036 1.0959 *** 0.0530 -0.0721 *** 0.0230 
Avg. Bedrooms -0.0235 *** 0.0070 -3.9626 *** 0.3450 0.0200 * 0.0111 
Construction 0.0596 *** 0.0065 0.8130 *** 0.1383 0.0701 *** 0.0124 
observations 106,209   105,332      
Note: All models include MSA fixed effects; P equation also includes city-specific rent gradients and a county-level natural amenity score.  All 
equations include the M vector.  ***, **, * for p<0.01, <0.05, <0.10, respectively. 
 3 
 
Table 5: Partial, Full and Indirect Effects, various models 
Model column(s) Direct Full Indirect Indirect/se(direct) 
OLS, control group identification 2.1, 2.2 0.2211 0.2211 0.0000 0.00 
OLS, auxiliary regression 2.3, 2.4 0.4059 0.4315 0.0256 0.59 
OLS, control group w/ buffers 4.1a 0.2307 0.2310 0.0003 0.01 
2SLS, control group identification 3.1 0.3458 0.3241 -0.0218 -0.74 
2SLS, auxiliary regression 3.2 0.4802 0.4096 -0.0705 -1.73 
2SLS, control group w/ buffers 4.2 0.3922 0.1013 -0.2908 -9.96 
a Full effect computed with results from an unreported regression which is available from the authors. 
